Laos
is a country with an underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in rural
areas. It has a basic, but improving, road system, and limited external and
internal landline telecommunications. Electricity is available over 75% of the
country. Laos' economy is heavily dependent on capital-intensive natiural
resouce exports. The labor force, however, still relies on agriculture,
dominated by rice cultivation in lowland areas, which accounts for about 30% of
GDP and 75% of total employment. Economic growth has reduced official poverty
rates from 46% in 1992 to 26% in 2010. The economy also has benefited from
high-profile foreign direct investment in hydropower, copper and gold mining,
logging, and construction though some projects in these industries have drawn
criticism for their environmental impacts.
Laos
is not a regional or offshore financial center. However, its position at the
crossroads of mainland Southeast Asia’s drug trade, high rate of economic
growth, and weak legal and regulatory framework make it vulnerable to money
laundering activities. In 2011, the Government of Laos (GOL) reiterated an
earlier estimate of the value of the illicit drug economy of 10% of GDP, or
approximately $750 million.
Development
assistance from overseas donors accounts for over 80% of the GOL operating
budget; there are concerns that a substantial portion of this funding may be
stolen and subsequently laundered. Reliable public reporting of revenues from
government and private mining and hydropower assets is often lacking. Bulk cash
smuggling to Thailand, China, and Vietnam is likely occurring. During 2011 Lao
law enforcement authorities seized several large amounts of cash during
counternarcotics operations.
Lao
banks are not optimal for moving large amounts of money in any single
transaction, due to the visibility of such movements in a small, low-tech
environment. What money laundering does take place through Lao banks is likely
to have been from illegal timber sales or domestic criminal activity, including
drug trafficking. In a recent high-profile case involving a foreign-owned
company accused of securities fraud, Lao customs authorities seized $300,000 in
cash a businessman was transporting to Thailand, in contravention of Lao law.
Subsequent investigation indicated that this business had transferred several
million dollars from abroad through the Lao banking system in the past year,
much of which was reportedly withdrawn in cash. The case revealed the weakness
of the Lao banking system in monitoring suspicious transactions.
Laos
is the third largest producer of opium in the world, although much of it is
consumed domestically. The country has no anti-money laundering legislation,
even though it is a regional financial center. Because Laos has strict laws on
the exporting of currency it is suspected that laundering out of the country is
achieved through alternative remittance systems.
The
gaming industry, primarily driven by Chinese tourists visiting casinos in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) near
the border, continues to present a
money-laundering opportunity outside of
the formal financial sector. The Ministry of Information and
Culture (MOIC) is responsible for the
regulation of casinos in Laos. However,
its regulatory regime has no known AML controls for casinos in place. Inside the financial
system, the legal regime is inadequate
to cope with the rapid growth of the banking sector, which has grown by approximately one-quarter
in the last two years. SEZs present an
additional complication for the anti-money
laundering (AML) regime, as it is not clear that MOIC regulatory authority applies to casinos located inside
the SEZs.
The
GOL continues to struggle with the implementation of existing anti-money
laundering laws and decrees. Financial institutions, law enforcement, the
Anti-Money Laundering Intelligence Unit (AMLIU) in the Bank of Laos (BOL), and
justice system personnel still lack a clear awareness of the threat of money
laundering. The establishment of a banking industry trade association in
November 2011 provides a possible avenue for raising awareness about money
laundering and financial crimes. The GOL should pursue additional avenues to
ensure that covered entities are aware of their compliance responsibilities.
Reporting
entities designated in the AML decree, other than financial institutions,
remain unsupervised for AML purposes. The BOL-issued guidelines for suspicious
transaction reporting have resulted in only a small number of reports to date.
None are known to have resulted in referrals to law enforcement. The AMLIU
continues to lack the technical and procedural means to detect and refer such
cases. The GOL should improve the monitoring of all entities not supervised by
the Bank of Laos for AML/CFT compliance. Laos began to address the vulnerabilities
in the gaming industry through the issuance of a new Prime Ministerial Decree
in 2010.
Laos
lacks a clear legal and procedural framework for the seizure of assets. The Lao
criminal code and drug laws refer to the right
of the state to seize assets of convicted drug traffickers, but the legal and procedural processes are not
specified, and thus neither the
prosecutors nor the court system have taken any legal action regarding asset seizures. The lack of
an asset forfeiture regime could hinder Lao assistance in money laundering or
terrorist financing investigations and assistance requests. The GOL should
implement an asset forfeiture regime that includes a system to account for
forfeited assets and ensure they are disposed of in accordance with the laws.
There
are positive developments in Lao in relation to anti-money laundering efforts:
·
There
is an AML Decree which contains some of the necessary elements of a
satisfactory AML CFT Law. However, some key elements are absent.
·
A
coordination Working Group has been established. All key ministries are
represented. This is important as it provides a framework for policy and
operational coordination.
·
There
appears to be a good working relationship between the AMLIU and the other government
agencies.
·
The
AMLIU has been established with 10 Staff including the Director General.
·
The
AMLIU issued a Guideline on Reporting Suspicious Transactions and The Guideline
on AML Procedures and Operational Control for Financial Institutions
under supervision of the Bank of Lao PDR. In addition, AMLIU has issued two
instructions to banks.
·
Some
reporting of suspicious transactions has occurred but the numbers are very low.
·
Lao
PDR is a member of the APG and through this has access to information about
new AML CFT methodologies. It attends APG meeting, Typologies Workshops and
other APG arranged training and technical assistance.
·
The
UNODC has had in place a system of AML CFT Mentors who provide assistance to
Lao PDR, Vietnam and Cambodia.
·
Location
of the FIU within the framework of the BOL provides a number of benefits.
·
As a
member of ASEAN, Lao PDR is a party to a regional mutual legal assistance
treaty.
·
Lao
PDR has been a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism since 29 October 2008. Lao PDR has signed (10 December 2003) and ratified (25 September 2009)
the UN Convention against Corruption. LAO PDR has acceded to (26 September 2003) the UN Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime.
·
The
Ministry of Public Security has recently established the Anti Financial Crimes
Division within the Economic Police Department to investigate all
financial crimes including money laundering activities.
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